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I. Introduction
These are difficult times for the European legal order and its effective enforcement. 
Despite the positive impact of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the perils to which the 
system of judicial protection is subjected is reflected by the debate on how violations of 
individual rights contained in European Union (EU) law can be adequately sanctioned. 
The heroic days of historical judgments are after all long gone and many criticisms have 
been levelled at whether the EU judiciary is still able to deliver an efficient and fair 
system of protection.1 It is equally true that supranational judicial protection may no 
longer be as necessary as it once was owing to the maturity of the EU legal system. The 
progressive internalization of both the substantive and remedial dimension of EU law 
has gradually shifted the attention and the question of intensity of protection from the 
Luxembourg Court— for many years the supreme guardian of EU individual rights— to 
national authorities and domestic courts.2
* Andrea Biondi is Professor of EU Law and Director of the Centre of European Law, King’s College, 
London. Martin Farley is a member of the Legal Service of the European Commission and Fellow of the 
Centre of European Law, King’s College, London. The views expressed in this article are those of the writers 
and may not be regarded as stating an official position of any institution to which they are affiliated.
1 J. Komarek, ‘In the Court(s) We Trust? On the Need for Hierarchy and Differentiation in the Preliminary 
Ruling Procedure’ (2007) 32(4) European Law Review 467; and M. Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU 
Law (OUP 2014).
2 The decentralization of the competition law regime following the introduction of Regulation 1/ 2003 
and the increase in private enforcement of competition law is a particularly good example of the increased 
role that is now played by national regulators and judiciaries. Indeed, the adoption of Directive 2014/ 104 on 
antitrust damages actions places responsibility firmly in the hands of national courts to ensure that victims of 
anti- competitive conduct receive adequate redress through damages to compensate them for losses suffered as 
a result of breaches of EU competition law. See further below.
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Actions for damages are emblematic of this context: an extremely technical area that is, how-
ever, rich with constitutional symbols but which is ultimately concerned with the provision 
of very practical relief for the individuals affected. Opinions on all the above issues are usually 
rather polarized with some authors despairing on the current state of affairs and others with 
more optimistic views. The current contribution will attempt to recap the past, discuss the 
present, and risk some predictions on the scope of application of an action for damages in EU 
law in the future. It will analyse the question of adequate judicial protection based on com-
pensation in damages trough two ‘prisms’: first, as a specific remedy available to individuals to 
hold Member States— and to a more limited extent— private individuals— liable in damages 
where they violated EU law, and, secondly, as a right in damages for the direct liability of 
the European Union as represented through its institutions and as a derived liability of the 
Union as an employer.
II. Damages in EU Law: A Snapshot
A.  From Community Liability to State Liability and Back
(1)  The Origins
An action for damages has always been contemplated within the EU legal order. The European 
Coal and Steel Community Treaty provided for not just one but actually two kinds of action. 
Article 34 allowed undertakings to bring an action in damages for direct and particular injury 
in the event of the annulment of a Community act. Even more interestingly, Article 40 
provided for a general clause of non- contractual liability. The Court was given jurisdiction 
‘to assess damages against the Community, at the request of the injured party, in cases where 
injury results from a fault involved in an official act of the Community in execution of the 
present Treaty’.3
Article 40 became Article 215 in the EEC Treaty, was transformed into Article 288 of the EC 
Treaty (following the Treaty of Nice), and has finally become Article 340 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In the case of non- contractual liability, Article 
340 TFEU provides that ‘the EU shall, in accordance with the general principles common 
to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its 
servants in the performance of their duties’. The European Union is then liable for both fautes 
de service— wrongful acts attributable to its institutions— and fautes personelles— wrongful 
acts on the part of its employees. As in many national legal systems, such a general clause of 
non- contractual liability does not spell out the criteria to be employed to determine actual 
liability. Moreover, as is the case in many domestic systems, these gaps have been gradually 
filled by the case law of the European Court of Justice (CJEU), which has clarified that liabil-
ity can only be ascertained if the following elements are present: the presence of actual dam-
age, a causal link between the damage caused and the conduct alleged against the institution, 
and the illegality of such conduct.4
The case law of the Court delved deeper into those conditions and gradually developed a 
rather convoluted system that very rarely led to successful actions against the then European 
Community. In particular, the Court elaborated two different tests for establishing whether 
the Community could be held liable in damages depending on the classification of the 
3 For a general analysis of the law in those days see the several contributions in T. Heukels and A. McDonnell 
(eds), The Action for Damages in Community Law (Kluwer 1997).
4 See Case 4/ 69 Alfons Lütticke GmbH v Commission EU:C:1971:40, para 10; Case T- 575/ 93 Koelman v 
Commission [1996] ECR II- 1, EU:T:1996:1, para 89.
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measure in question as either an ‘administrative act’ or a ‘legislative act’. In relation to admin-
istrative acts, the Court determined that the requirement of unlawful conduct would be satis-
fied by any infringement of law. In relation to legislative measures, however, an unlawful act 
would only expose the Community to liability in damages if the breach in question consti-
tuted a sufficiently serious breach of a superior rule of law for the protection of individuals.5
(2)  Il Signor Francovich and Member State Liability
The action for damages provisions only came to the fore when they began directly to affect 
the financial interests of Member States. After several years of cautious and oblique references 
to the possibility of holding Member States liable for violating their obligations under EU 
law,6 in one of the most celebrated cases of the whole history of European Law, Francovich v 
Italy,7 the European Court of Justice famously held that:
the full effectiveness of Community rules would be impaired and the protection of the rights 
which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when their 
rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for which a Member State can be held 
responsible.
The possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is particularly indispensable 
where, as in this case, the full effectiveness of Community rules is subject to prior action 
on the part of the State and where, consequently, in the absence of such action, individuals 
cannot enforce before the national courts the rights conferred upon them by Community 
law. It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss and damage caused 
to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the State can be held 
responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty.8
This empathic statement of principle was a logical extension of the Court’s reasoning on 
the, by then, well- established constitutional doctrine of direct effect and on the need for 
national courts to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law.9 It is not by chance that all of the 
‘foundational cases’— van Gend en Loos, Costa v ENEL, Simmenthal, and Factortame II— are 
cited as precedent to support the Court’s findings in Francovich.10 The ‘theory’ was swiftly 
followed by ‘practice’ in the subsequent case of Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, which 
added flesh to the bones that had been created by the Court in Francovich.11 In that case, the 
Court, specifically referencing Community liability as its source of inspiration, specified that 
the essential procedural conditions to bring an action for damages were that ‘the rule of law 
5 Joined Cases T- 481/ 93 and T- 484/ 93 Vereniging van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v Commission 
EU:T:1995:209; Joined Cases 261/ 78 and 262/ 78 Interquell Strärke- Chemie v EEC EU:C: 1982:329.
6 See for an account N. Green and A. Barav, ‘Damages in the National Courts for Breach of Community 
Law’ (1986) 6 Yearbook of European Law 55.
7 Joined Cases C- 6 and C- 9/ 90 Francovich and Others v Italy [1991] ECR I- 5357, EU:C:1991:428.
8 Ibid paras 33 and 34.
9 In these Brexit days, it might be useful to note that the EFTA Court came to the same conclusions 
when it held that: ‘it is a principle of the EEA Agreement that the Contracting Parties are obliged to pro-
vide for compensation for loss and damage caused to individuals by breaches of the obligations under the 
EEA Agreement for which the EFTA States can be held responsible’. It also added that it is ‘natural to 
interpret national legislation implementing the main part of the Agreement as also comprising the principle 
of State liability’. See Case E- 9/ 97 Sveinsbjörnsdóttir [1998] EFTA Court Reports 95 (advisory opinion of 
10 December 1998); [1999] 1 Common Market Law Review 884, paras 63 and 64. See further C. Baudenbacher, 
‘If Not EEA State Liability, Then What? Reflections Ten Years after the EFTA Court’s Sveinbjörnsdóttir 
Ruling’ (2009) 10(1) Chicago Journal of International Law 333.
10 Case 26/ 62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1, EU:C:1963:1; Case 6/ 64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 
585, EU:C:1964:66; Case 106/ 77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1968] ECR 629, 
EU:C:1978:49; and Case C- 213/ 89 Factortame [1990] ECR I- 2433, EU:C:1990:257.
11 Joined Cases C- 46/ 93 and C- 48/ 93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame [1996] ECR I- 1029, 
EU:C:1996:79.
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infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently 
serious; and there must be a direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on 
the State and the damage sustained by the injured parties’.12
(3)  The Alignment of Liability Conditions
Finally, in an elegantly performed U- turn, the Court ‘reinterpreted’ the conditions for trig-
gering EU liability contained in Article 340 TFEU and aligned them to those laid down by 
the Court in Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame for the purposes of establishing Member 
State liability. In its ruling in Bergaderm,13 the CJEU disposed of the old distinctions between 
administrative and legislative acts and held that the conditions elaborated in Brasserie du 
Pêcheur and Factortame should also be applied for actions for damages against EU institu-
tions. If the aim of all human exploration is to arrive where we began (bona pace T. S. Eliot), 
the European legal order eventually obtained its own action of neminen laedere both against 
EU institutions and Member States.
III. The Importance of Actions for Damages within  
the EU Legal Order
A.  The CJEU Case Law: Between Federalist Aspirations and Respect for  
the Rule of Law
(1)  Damages and the EU Constitutional Order
The Italian Court’s preliminary reference in the Francovich case posed two questions to the 
CJEU. The first was whether Mr Francovich was entitled to rely on the provisions of Directive 
80/ 987,14 which provided for the protection of employees in the event of redundancy. In par-
ticular, it provided for specific guarantees of payment of unpaid wage claims. Italy failed to 
implement the directive on time and it had also been condemned by the CJEU in a direct 
action.15 Despite acknowledging the Member State’s blatant violation of EU obligations, the 
CJEU replied that the relevant provisions of the Directive did not have direct effect as they 
were not sufficiently precise and unconditional so as to give rise to rights that individuals 
could enforce before the Italian court.
By its second question, the national court sought the CJEU’s assistance on whether, despite 
the directive’s lack of direct effect, an individual was nevertheless entitled to claim repa-
ration of the loss and damage sustained as a result of the Italian State’s failure to imple-
ment the Directive. If not, such individuals risked being deprived of any protection in such 
circumstances.
It would have been easier, and perhaps safer, for the Court to follow the Opinion of its 
Advocate General and merely refer to the general principles on non- contractual liability com-
mon to the national legal systems of the Member States and remind the national court of the 
need to ensure that an action of liability should not be made subject to excessively difficult 
conditions such as to impair the principle of effective application of EU law. Had it done so, 
the CJEU would have recast the imposition of liability in a slighter softer fashion.
12 Ibid para 51.
13 Case C- 352/ 98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission [2000] ECR I- 5291, EU:C:2000:361.
14 Council Directive 80/ 987/ EEC of 20 October 1980 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer [1980] OJ 
L283/ 23.
15 Case 22/ 87 Commission v Italy [1989] ECR 143, EU:C:1989:45.
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The CJEU instead decided to deploy the most powerful weapon within its arsenal of EU 
law doctrine by forging a direct link between an action for damages and the need to ensure 
supremacy of the EU legal order: the need to ensure effectiveness of the application of EU law 
and guarantee respect for individual rights. The Court reiterated the same stance in Brasserie 
du Pêcheur and Factortame. In reply to the argument presented by Germany at the hearing, 
that a principle of liability should have been introduced by legislation (eg via a political con-
sensus) and not via litigation, the CJEU reiterated that the Court’s role was to ensure that the 
law was observed and, in doing so, due account was to be taken of the governing principles 
of the EU legal order, namely: the full effectiveness of Community rules and the effective pro-
tection of the rights which they confer; and the obligation to cooperate imposed on Member 
States by Article 5 of the Treaty (now Article 4(3) TEU).16
(2)  Damages and Federalist Aspirations
Thus, liability in damages against a defaulting Member State was born with a constitutional 
status. It still debatable whether that was a blessing or a curse. Most of the initial comments 
were rather enthusiastic, commending the Court for reaffirming the centrality of the need 
to respect the rule of law17 and for enhancing the catalogue of individual rights.18 Others 
were much more critical and lamented what they saw as undue interferences with national 
law or an excessive emphasis on the imposition of sanctions.19 The finding that an action 
for damages was available to individuals against Member States is, however, neither particu-
larly surprising nor shocking if placed in the proper EU constitutional milieu;20 or, in the 
more lively language of Advocate General Tesauro in Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame: 
‘far from being a moment of eccentricity in the case law of the Court, Francovich was com-
pletely consistent with and a logical extension of a value which has been upheld on several 
occasions without question in Luxembourg:  effectiveness of Community provisions and 
hence complete judicial protection’.21 However, the mere idea of making the Member State 
responsible for breaches of its ‘supranational’ obligations at the hands of one of its citizens 
was considered by some as ‘revolutionary’ and thus sometimes difficult to accept.22 As noted 
elsewhere, it is peculiar that even in fully fledged federalist systems such as the USA, the loy-
alty of states towards the Federation stops when it is a question of financial compensation.23  
16 Joined Cases C- 46/ 93 and C- 48/ 93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame (n 11) para 27.
17 J.  Steiner, ‘From Direct Effects to Francovich:  Shifting Means of Enforcement of Community Law’ 
(1993) 18(1) European Law Review 3.
18 W. Van Gerven, ‘Non- Contractual Liability of Member States, Community Institutions and Individuals 
for Breaches of Community Law with a View to a Common Law for Europe’ (1994) 1 Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law 6; W. Van Gerven, ‘Bridging the Unbridgeable: Community and National 
Tort Laws after Francovich and Brasserie’ (1996) 45 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 507.
19 C. Harlow, ‘Francovich and the Problem of the Disobedient State’ (1996) 2 European Law Journal 
199; and C. Harlow, ‘A Common European Law of Remedies’ in C. Kilpatrick, T. Novitz and P. Skidmore, 
The Future of Remedies in Europe (Hart Publishing 2000)  69. See also S. Douglas Scott and R. Caranta, 
‘Governmental Liability after Francovich’ (1993) 52 Cambridge Law Journal 272; (.  C. Harlow, State 
Liability: Tort Law and Beyond (OUP 2004) 57.
20 A. Biondi and M. Farley, The Right to Damages in European Law (Kluwer 2009). See also T. Tridimas, 
The General Principles of EU Law (2nd edn, OUP 2006) 313 ff.
21 See AG Tesauro’s Opinion in Joined Cases C- 46/ 93 and C- 48/ 93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame 
(n 11) para 32.
22 Some of the national courts decisions based on a sort of last century reading of state powers can only be 
explained because of the novelty to the state liability doctrine. See for instance the (in)famous Italian Court 
of Cassation, Sez III Civile, case no 4915 of 1 April 2003, in Foro Italiano I (2003), 2016.
23 A. Biondi, ‘In Praise of Francovich’ in M. Poiares Maduro and L. Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future 
of EU Law: The Classics of EU law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart Publishing 
2010) 413. See also G. A. Berman, ‘Member State Liability in the Member State’s Own Court: An American 
Law Comparison’ in N. Colneric and others (eds), Une Communauté de droit, Festschrift Gil Carlos Rodriguez 
Iglesias (BWV 2003) 305.
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In EU law, a liability action (especially if successful!) is tangible evidence of a loss of sov-
ereignty as the individual, by appealing directly to the supranational authority, ‘reduced’ 
the Member State to just another tortfeasor. In this context, a further element should be 
emphasized. In its case law on the liability of Member States, the Court has always been 
extremely vigorous in denying any relevance of the internal allocation or intra- state dif-
ferentiations within the Member State in question. In line with its rigid case law on direct 
actions under Article 263 TFEU,24 the Court considered that a Member State should not 
be entitled to avoid claims in damages on the basis, for instance, of arguments such as the 
entity responsible for the potential breach of EU law being autonomous and independent 
from the central government. For instance, in Konle, a case dealing with the allocation of 
competences within the Austrian constitution, the Court held that a Member State ‘cannot, 
therefore, plead the distribution of powers and responsibilities between the bodies which 
exist in its national legal order to free itself from liability on that basis’.25 Similarly, the deci-
sion to devolve certain legislative or administrative tasks to territorial bodies with a certain 
degree of autonomy, or to any other public law body legally distinct from the Member State, 
cannot prejudice an action for liability.26
Finally, the ‘stronger’ symbol of the federalist character of an action for damages must be 
the equally strong line of statements whereby the Court refused to draw any distinctions 
on the basis of whether the breach could be attributed to the legislator, regulatory authori-
ties, administrative bodies, or even courts. In Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame, which 
concerned a potential breach of EU law by the German and British Parliaments, the Court 
emphatically declared that the principle of liability ‘holds good for any case in which a 
Member State breaches Community law, whatever be the organ of the State whose act or 
omission was responsible for the breach’.27 The firmness of such statement was severely tested 
in the Gerhard Köbler v Republic of Austria28 judgment. As is well known, in that judgment 
the CJEU confirmed the principle that Member States are obliged to make good damage 
caused to individuals even when this is caused by decisions of national courts infringing EU 
law. In its judgment, the Court reiterated its finding in Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame 
and with support of case law on liability of courts in the context of international law and 
the European Convention of Human Rights, whilst emphasizing the decisive role played by 
national courts in protecting EU individual rights, the Court concluded that the full effect-
iveness of EU rules conferring such rights would be brought into question if individuals were 
precluded from being able, under certain conditions, to obtain reparation when their rights 
are affected by an infringement of Community law attributable to a decision of a court of 
a Member State. Such an approach was deemed to be particularly appropriate with respect 
to courts adjudicating at last instance.29 The judgment has attracted a copious amount of 
24 Case 77/ 69 Commission v Belgium [1970] ECR 237, EU:C:1970:34; and Case 169/ 82 Commission v 
Italy [1984] ECR 1603, EU:C:1984:126.
25 Case C- 302/ 97 Konle v Austria [1999] ECR I- 3099, EU:C:1999:271, para 62.
26 Case C- 424/ 97 Haim v Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein (Haim II) [2000] ECR I- 5123, 
EU:C:2000:357, paras 31 and 32.
27 Joined Cases C- 46/ 93 and C- 48/ 93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame(n 11) para 32.
28 Case C- 224/ 01 Köbler v Austria ([2001] ECR I- 10239, EU:C:2003:513.
29 Case C- 224/ 01 Köbler (n 28)paras 33– 35. The CJEU has since confirmed that the same principle 
applies with respect to breaches committed by the CJEU itself or the General Court. See eg Case C- 40/ 12 P 
Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission EU:C:2013:768, paras 80– 103; Case C- 58/ 12 P Groupe Gascogne 
v Commission EU:C:2013:770, paras 72– 97; Case C- 50/ 12 P Kendrion v Commission EU:C:2013:771 paras 
38– 63. See further Case T- 577/ 14 Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne v European Union EU:T:2017:1; 
Case T- 479/ 14 Kendrion NV v European Union EU:T:2017:48; and Case T- 725/ 14 Aalberts Industries NV v 
European Union EU:T:2017:47.
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literature exposing numerous and sophisticated points of views.30 Most of the criticisms are 
directed at the practical implications of such a judgment. However, as we are dealing with 
symbols, it is impossible not to see the dramatic implications that these judgments have in 
terms of sovereignty for the Member States. The issue is not, in our view, simply a question of 
a possible erosion of the holy principle of the independence of the judiciary, to which many 
commentators point. Rather, it is slightly subtler or, you may say, psychological. While of 
course Member States had, in one way or another, accepted that their actions could always 
be judicially reviewed and in some cases annulled or declared void, such acceptance did not, 
in many cases, foresee the sort of ignominy that an action for damages against its own courts 
could cause if found ‘guilty’ of having breached EU law. In a Köbler scenario, the Member 
State loses yet another essential state function: that is, the provision of an unbiased forum for 
a citizen who, having suffering personal injury, is now seeking relief. This time, the tortfeasor 
is the national court itself.
(3)  Damages and the Principle of Good Administration
An action for damages has of course a second, important constitutional function:  that of 
ensuring respect for the rule of law and to maximize judicial protection. Such a function 
is best exemplified if we now turn to actions for damages against EU institutions. For dec-
ades, the case law of the Court concerning, at the time, Community liability actions had 
been fiercely criticized for the excessive technicalities that, for many, constituted too high 
an obstacle for guaranteeing an effective remedy in compensation. Furthermore, an action 
in damages was for many years treated as a form of ancillary remedy in comparison to other 
forms of judicial review of Community action such as actions for annulment under, what is 
now, Article 263 TFEU.31 In performing a sort of legal illusion in the Bergaderm case, the 
CJEU, which had once used the existence of the provision on actions in damages against 
Community institutions as one of the foundations for establishing a duty on Member States 
to compensate individuals in damages, re- interpreted the criteria for such an action by using 
the same conditions that it had laid down for Member State liability as the criteria that 
needed to be fulfilled for an action in damages against EU institutions.
Whether in reality the two actions are still governed by different conditions will be discussed 
below; however, the highly symbolic value of the Bergaderm decision is there to be seen. 
There are some echoes of a Les Vertes plea on the need to ensure full accountability for EU 
action32 by stating that no differences should exist for citizens regardless of whether their 
individual rights have been breached by their Member State or by the supranational regula-
tor. Furthermore, a sort of elevated status for actions for damages is confirmed by two further 
pieces of ‘evidence’. First, there is now a consistent line of case law that seems to confirm 
that the action for EU damages is now a totally autonomous form of action, implying that 
it should be considered independent from the question of whether a certain EU measure 
can be challenged by any other form of action, for instance in an action for annulment.33 
Secondly, actions for damages have now been formally enshrined in Article 41(3) of the 
30 For a useful overview see B.  Beutler, ‘State Liability for Breaches of Community Law by National 
Courts: Is the Requirement of a Manifest Infringement of the Applicable Law an Insurmountable Obstacle?’ 
(2009) 46 Common Market Law Review 773.
31 See W. Van Gerven, ‘Taking Article 215(2) EC Seriously’ in J. Beatson and T. Tridimas (eds), New 
Directions in European Public Law (Hart Publishing 1998) 35.
32 Case 294/ 83 Les Vertes v EP [1986] ECR 133, EU:C:1986:166.
33 Joined Cases T- 440/ 03, 121, 171, 208, 365 , and 484/ 04 Arizmendi and Others v Council and 
Commission [2009] ECR II- 4883, EU:T:2009:530. See the discussion by K. Gutman, ‘The Evolution of the 
Action for Damages Against the European Union and Its Place in the System Of Judicial Protection’ (2011) 
48 Common Market Law Review 695.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Fri Oct 27 2017, NEWGEN
law-9780199533770-Ch31-35.indd   1046 10/27/2017   11:02:49 PM
III. The Importance of Actions for Damages within the EU Legal Order
1047
Charter of Fundamental rights and it is one of the facets of the general principle of good 
administration.34
(4)  The Limits of a Symbol: Damages against the Individual
Private liability for breaches of EU law is based on a sort of equation: the amount of litera-
ture is proportional to the little practical impact this had on the general EU law discourse. 
The same cannot be said for sectorial areas most notably competition law. The debate on the 
question of the rights and obligations imposed on individuals and on the outer limits of the 
doctrine of direct effect is certainly a debate worth continuing.35 On the question of liability, 
when dealing with individuals, the emphasis, at least in the Court’s case law, has always been 
based on traditionalist retribution/ repressive ideas of damages. In the very much celebrated 
cases of Courage,36 and later Manfredi37 and Kone,38 the Court supported the contention that 
a right in damages against another private party for breach of the competition rules must in 
principle be available for an individual for a ‘loss caused by a contract or by conduct liable to 
restrict or distort competition’.39 The Court rulings have been certainly decisive in leading to 
the adoption of Directive 2014/ 104 on antitrust damages.40 However, it would be misleading 
to draw the conclusion that the Court was simply developing the Francovich doctrine so as 
to sketch a general principle of private party liability for breaches of EU law. The justification 
for the findings in Courage was firmly based on the need to strengthen the functioning of 
EU competition rules by developing private enforcement in addition to public enforcement 
so as to discourage agreements or practices that are liable to restrict or distort competition. 
This is eventually the model adopted by the Damages Directive. However, despite some 
empathic wording in the preamble— whereby it refers to the need for national courts, when 
ruling on competition law disputes between individuals, to ‘protect subjective rights under 
EU law’— the Damages Directive does not establish any broader principles than had already 
been established by the CJEU in Courage. Rather, the Damages Directive simply reflects 
the decentralized antitrust model established by Regulation 1/ 2003, which increased the 
role played by national authorities and courts in enforcing the competition law rules under 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. The principal purpose of the Damages Directive is not to extend 
the substantive right to damages, but rather to ensure that the procedural rules governing 
actions for damages brought against individual undertakings for breaches of competition 
34 See H. C. H. Hofmann, G. C. Rowe, and A. H. Türk, Administrative Law and Policy of the EU (OUP 
2011) ch 7 section F. In this context, it might be worth mentioning the discussion on the relationship on 
actions for damages for unlawful conduct and other forms of possible redress such as damages for lawful 
action and unjust enrichment. In a series of high profile cases the General Court and the CJEU sparred on 
the whether a general principle of non- contractual liability derived from national law compensation can 
be granted. See Joined Cases C- 120 and 121/ 06 P FIAMM and Others v Council and Commission [2008] 
ECR I- 6513, EU:T:2009:530, dismissing appeal against the decisions in Case T- 69/ 00 FIAMM and FIAMM 
Technologies v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II- 5393, EU:T:2005:449 and Case C- 47/ 07 P Masdar 
(UK) Ltd v Commission [2008] ECR I- 9761, EU:C:2008:726, dismissing appeal of Case T- 333/ 03 Masdar 
(UK) Ltd v Commission [2006] ECR II- 4377, EU:T:2006:348. The Court was reluctant to go down that road 
but reaffirmed the link between the need to respect fundamental rights and compensation.
35 On the specific questions of damages against individuals see D. Leczykiewicz, ‘Private Party Liability in 
EU law: In Search of the General Regime’ (2009– 10) 12 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies , 257.
36 Case C- 453/ 99 Crehan v Courage Ltd [2001] ECR I- 6297, EU:C:2001:465.
37 Case C- 295/ 04 Vincenzo Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others [2006] 
ECR I- 6619, EU:C:2006:461.
38 Case C- 557/ 12 Kone AG and Others EU:C:2014:1317.
39 Ibid para 26. See N. Dunne, ‘Antitrust and the Making of European Tort Law’ (2016) Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 36.
40 Directive 2014/ 104/ EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on 
certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law 
provisions of the Member States and of the European Union [2014] OJ L329/ 1.
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rules enable victims to exercise their rights to damages effectively and establish a system 
whereby private and public enforcement interact coherently so as to maximize the effective-
ness of competition law enforcement.
Furthermore— to our knowledge— the only other time the Court relied on Courage outside 
the realm of competition law was to reaffirm that, in certain contexts, the availability of a 
compensation action can prompt competitors to take action to ensure fair trading and trans-
parency of markets in the EU. As some have correctly noted,41 the Court, contrary to the 
Francovich language in Courage, thus did not identify the necessity for an action in damages 
as a matter of right, but simply mandates the availability of damages.42
IV. How Does an Action for Damages against Member States Work?
A.  Non- contractual Liability in Damages against the State
It is now time to turn to the specific rules regulating an action for damages. As set out in the 
previous section, the Court laid down three cumulative conditions that need to be satisfied in 
order for an action for damages to be successful: the rule of law infringed must be intended 
to confer rights on individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a 
direct causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the Member State and the 
damage sustained by the injured parties.43
(1)  EU Law versus National Procedural Law
Despite the insistence of the Court that those conditions are ‘necessary and sufficient’ 
to found a right in favour of individuals to obtain compensation, in reality, they are not 
exhaustive. It is wise to reiterate that a Francovich action being so rooted in domestic law 
and ultimately granted by national courts, is subject to the specific provisions (and vagar-
ies) of national procedural law. The ‘hybrid’44 character of liability claims thus means that 
some essential elements such as the conditions to start litigation, causes of action, or most 
of the detailed procedural rules are left entirely to the domestic legal system. With one 
important caveat. This autonomy is a ‘qualified’ one as it is subject to the general princi-
ples of EU law of equivalence and effectiveness. As often observed by the Court, all of the 
material and formal conditions laid down by national procedural law on actions for dam-
ages cannot be less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims and cannot 
be so framed as to make it, in practice, impossible or excessively difficult to obtain com-
pensation.45 These two conditions have been gradually subsumed into a general principle 
of effective judicial protection that— after the Charter of Fundamental Rights was made 
41 See Dunne (n 39).
42 Case C- 453/ 99 Crehan v Courage Ltd (n 38) para 26. To draw a parallel, in an essentially private– private 
legal scenario such as actions based on discrimination, starting with the seminal judgment in Von Colson, the 
Court insisted that any national implementing legislation should guarantee, in order to make effective the 
whole machinery of a directive, that adequate compensation in damages should be available to the individual 
complainant. See Case 14/ 83 Von Colson [1984] ECR 1891, EU:C:1984:153.
43 Joined Cases C- 46/ 93 and C- 48/ 93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame (n 11). This three- part test is 
now routinely recited in the case law of the Court on damages action. See for instance Case C- 446/ 04, Test 
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation EU:C:2006:774 or Case C- 318/ 13 Request for a Preliminary Ruling from 
the Korkein Hallinto- Oikeus EU:C:2014:2133.
44 N. Reich, ‘Horizontal Liability in EC Law: Hybridization of Remedies for Compensation in Case of 
Breaches of EC Rights’ (2007) 44 Common Market Law Review 707.
45 See, to that effect, Joined Cases C- 6 and C- 9/ 90 Francovich and Others v Italy (n 7) para 43; and Case 
C- 127/ 95 Norbrook Laboratories v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food EU:C:1998:151,para 111.
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legally binding following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon— has been elevated to 
the status of a fundamental right.46
Despite the emphatic tone of some of the Court’s judgments in this area, dealing with the minu-
tiae of national law is not always straightforward and the Luxembourg acquis can, at times, be 
somewhat flexible. For instance, in certain areas the Court seems content to model the EU claims 
entirely on national law. Effective judicial protection in claims for damages, for instance, has 
rarely troubled national limitation periods.47 On the contrary, in other contexts the Court felt it 
necessary to encroach more markedly into the sphere of national procedural rules. For instance, 
in Trasportes Urbanos, the question was whether Spanish law, under which, if the breach was con-
tained in legislation, an action for damages against the Member State was subject to a condition 
requiring the prior exhaustion of national remedies against a harmful administrative action, was 
compatible with EU law. Spanish law did not subject actions for damages to a prior exhaustion 
rule when these actions were alleging a breach of a constitutional right. The Court decided to go 
through a very detailed analysis of the national law in question and eventually concluded that, 
as actions for state liability under EU law and the one for damages for a breach of the Spanish 
Constitution were similar, Spanish law breached the principle of equivalence. Similarly, it hinted 
that, although the exhaustion of prior remedies is not per se objectionable from an effectiveness 
principle perspective, it could become so if this means that the applicant would be burdened 
with excessive procedural constraints and in cases where the other forms of actions are not easily 
actionable.48
(2)  The First Condition: Conferral of Rights for the Protection of Individuals
The first condition that needs to be satisfied for an action for damages against a Member State 
to succeed is that the EU rule infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals. As 
these criteria deal entirely with the application of EU law, the Court is of course fully entitled to 
determine its scope.49 An analysis of the case law in our view reveals a ‘double’ function of 
this rights– centred condition. On the one hand, it is essential in reinforcing the narrative 
of the EU legal order as ‘new’ because of its individual rights protection focus. On the other, it 
is there as a procedural device as it works as a gatekeeper in limiting the kind of actions that 
can be brought against Member States. In this sense, it does evoke the traditional case law of 
the Court on EU liability where it required the breach of ‘a superior rule of law for the pro-
tection of individuals’ to trigger an action for damages. It seems to us that the case law also 
evolved according to the evolution of the norms and rights that gradually become ‘accepted’ 
as worth protecting. For instance, the Court was eager to lend its authority to the new 
European consumer litigant on the basis of strongly individual oriented but carefully worded 
Directives. In several cases, the Court fully recognized50 that, of those, passengers and tourists 
have to be recognized as recipients of individual rights.51
46 Case C- 279/ 09 DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft GmbH v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland [2010] ECR I- 13849, EU:C:2009:725.
47 Case C- 261/ 95 Palmisani v INPS [1997] ECR I- 4025, EU:C:1997:351; Case C- 295/ 04 Vincenzo 
Manfredi and Others v Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA and Others(n 37) para 79; and Case C- 445/ 06 Danske 
Slagterier v Bundesrepublik Deutschland EU:C:2009:178.
48 See also Case C- 397/ 98 Metallgesellschaft and Others [2001] ECR I- 1727, EU:C:2001:134 and Case 
C- 243/ 09 Fuß [2010] ECR I- 09849, EU:C:2010:609.
49 Case C- 127/ 95 Norbrook Laboratories v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (n 45).
50 Directive 90/ 314 ECC on Package Travel Directive 90/ 314/ EEC, [1990] OJ, L158/ 59. See Joined Cases 
C- 178– 179/ 94 and C- 188– 190/ 94 Dillenkofer and Others v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [1996] ECR I- 4845, 
EU:C:1996:375; Case C- 140/ 97 Rechberger and Geindl v Austria [1999] ECR I- 3499, EU:C:1999:306.
51 Conversely, the Court has been very restrained in accepting that harmonization upon which the pro-
cess of creating the internal market is based could be equated to the existence of certain specific rights. For 
instance, it denied that a directive that requires Member States to notify draft technical regulations to the 
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The same process may happen in other areas. For instance, the Court was more reluctant to 
intervene in cases with potential abstract numbers of litigants. The Peter Paul52 case is par-
ticularly relevant in this regard. The controversy concerned the possibility for a group of indi-
viduals who had lost their deposits because of the collapse of a number of German banks to 
seek damages from the Member State. The applicants argued that the competent authorities 
failed to implement some of the EU banking directives,53 which, if properly implemented, 
would have protected deposits and would have ‘forced’ Germany to exercise a more effective 
supervisory role. The CJEU held that the Directives did not grant depositors a specific right 
to have the competent authorities adopt supervisory measures in their interest. The Court 
also observed in general that banking law directives and rules on supervisory obligations were 
based on considerations relating to the complexity of banking supervision, in the context of 
which the authorities were under an obligation to protect a plurality of interests, including, 
more specifically, the stability of the financial system. Those directives could not be inter-
preted, therefore, as conferring specific rights on individuals. The case dates from 2004. Since 
then the protection of depositors and banks’ accountability has become ‘mainstream’ and 
even the object of specific EU legislation.54
Interestingly, there is a hint of a possible revisiting of the strict approach taken by the 
Court in Peter Paul in the recent controversy involving an action brought by a series of 
depositors against the measures under the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) umbrella 
by the Euro group, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for the restructuring of the Cypriot banking sector. It was argued that the 
EU was liable in damages for the losses that the applicants had suffered as a consequence 
of those measures. Although the main thrust of the case focused on whether a Euro group 
statement or the Memorandum of Understanding finalized between the ESM and Cyprus 
can be imputed to the Commission or to the ECB, so that the EU Courts have jurisdic-
tion, in his Opinion, Advocate General Wahl raised an interesting point about damages. 
Advocate General Wahl considered that the loss claimed to have been suffered by the indi-
viduals on account of the finalization of the Memorandum of Understanding between the 
ESM and Cyprus was not caused by an institution of the EU since, first, the ESM is not an 
institution of the EU and, secondly, the adoption of the Memorandum of Understanding 
cannot be regarded as originating from the Commission or the ECB (the duties conferred 
on the Commission and the ECB within the ESM Treaty entail no power to make deci-
sions of their own and commit the ESM alone).55 Nevertheless, the Advocate General 
opined that since the Member State is responsible for the Memorandum of Understanding, 
the individuals who consider themselves to be prejudiced by this memorandum could 
potentially bring actions before national courts or tribunals and seek to have the Member 
State concerned held liable. In conclusion, the CJEU appears, understandably, to be wary 
of opening the gate to an actio popularis in damages. However, the notion of EU rights is 
naturally subject to continuous evolution.
Commission could be considered as creating individual rights, as it does not ‘define the substantive scope 
of the legal rule on the basis of which the national court must decide the case before it. See Case C- 443/ 
98 Unilever ECLI EU:C:2000:496, para 51 and Case C- 98/ 14 Berlington Hungary ECLI EU:C:2015:386.
52 Case C- 222/ 02 Peter Paul v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2004] ECR I- 9425, EU:C:2004:606. See also 
for some similar albeit not identical conclusions the EFTA Court decision in Case E- 16/ 11, EFTA v Iceland 
[2013] EFTA Ct Rep 4, ITL 052 (EFTA 2013) (28 January 2013).
53 Directive 94/ 19 [1994] OJ L135/ 5.
54 Directive 2014/ 59/ EU on recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (BRRD), 
OJ L173 (12 June 2014) 190.
55 Opinion of AG Wahl in Case C- 8/ 15 P Ledra Advertising Ltd EU:C:2016:701. The Court in its judg-
ment of 20 September 2016 did not address the point raised by its Advocate General.
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(3)  The Second Condition: Serious Breach
Much of the discussion in the Court’s case law has focused on the second condition for Member 
State liability: a Member State will not be liable in damages unless it has committed a sufficiently 
serious breach of EU law. The current picture, after more than ten years of decisions and com-
mentary, seems relatively clear. First and foremost, the seriousness of the breach must be related 
and measured against the clarity and precision of the EU legal provision at stake.56 Thus, in 
straightforward cases such as the failure to implement a directive in time,57 or where the provi-
sion in question could be considered as just an administrative formality,58 the seriousness of the 
breach is ‘automatically’ satisfied. The reverse is also true: so where the EU provisions are either 
ambiguous or confer a wide discretionary power on the Member States,59 or even when the case 
law of the Court of Justice might be particularly complex,60 other factors need to be taken into 
account. These factors, which, in our view, can be considered as neither cumulative nor exhaus-
tive,61 were famously indicated in Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame. The Court considered that 
the decisive test for finding that a breach of Community law is sufficiently serious is whether 
the Member State or the Community institution concerned ‘manifestly and gravely disregarded 
the limits on its discretion’.62 The Court continued, however, by adding other elements that had 
to be taken into account in establishing the seriousness of the breach. These elements include 
‘the clarity and precision of the rule breached, the measure of discretion left by that rule to 
the national or Community authorities, whether the infringement and the damage caused was 
intentional or involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable, the fact that 
the position taken by a Community institution may have contributed towards the omission, 
and the adoption or retention of national measures or practices contrary to Community law’.63
The two components— abuse of discretion/ other factors— of the serious breach conditions 
are obviously intertwined. As the Court stated in an often neglected judgment that dealt 
essentially with the interpretation of same directive that led to the Francovich case, Robins, 
the Court held that while the amount of discretion enjoyed by Member States is certainly 
an important factor for establishing whether the second condition of the liability test has 
been fulfilled, it is nevertheless ‘dependent on the degree of clarity and precision of the rule 
infringed’.64 Thus, the technique of the Court is usually not to adjudicate directly on the 
seriousness of the breach, which is generally, at least formally, left to the assessment of the 
national court but to limit itself to providing guidance on the meaning and implications 
of the EU rule at stake. It goes without saying that in carrying out such an operation, the 
national court in practice is left in no doubt as to what the CJEU really thinks about the 
seriousness of the breach.65
56 Case C- 424/ 97 Haim v Kassenzahnärztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein (Haim II)(n 26) para 40.
57 Case C- 63/ 01 Samuel Sidney Evans v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions 
[2003] ECR I- 14447, EU:C:2003:650; Case C- 150/ 99 Sweden v Lindöpark EU:C:2001:34.
58 Case C- 5/ 94 The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Hedley Lomas [1996] ECR 
I- 2553, EU:C:1996:205; and Case C- 470/ 03 A.G.M.- COS.MET Srl v Suomen valtio, Tarmo Lehtinen [2007] 
ECR I- 2749, EU:C:2007:213.
59 Case C- 392/ 93 The Queen v HM Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications plc ECR 1996 I- 1631) 
EU:C:1996:131.
60 Case C- 524/ 04 Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
[2007] ECR I- 2107.
61 See Opinion of Advocate- General Jacobs in Case C- 150/ 99 Sweden v Lindöpark Lindöpark (n 57).
62 Joined Cases C- 46/ 93 and C- 48/ 93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame(n 11) para 55.
63 Ibid paras 56– 57.
64 Case C- 278/ 05 Robins and Others EU:C:2007:56, paras 72 and 73. See also Case C- 452/ 06 Synthon 
EU: C: 2008:565,
65 Two clear examples are Case C- 278/ 05 Robins and Others (n 64) and, on the interpretation of the age 
discrimination directive, Case C- 501/ 12 Thomas Specht EU:C:2014:2005, para 105. In the latter case, the 
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The ‘scenario’ where the Court went the extra mile in detailing what a serious breach could 
mean is on liability for breaches committed by national courts. In the much- discussed Köbler 
judgment, the Court had to assess whether the fact that the Austrian court failed to apply a 
CJEU judgment and/ or to make a preliminary reference could lead to compensation. On the 
question of the seriousness of the breach, the Court found that the breach by the national 
court was not manifest. It relied on the argument that there was no EU law provision that 
expressly covered the point of law at issue and, secondly, that the infringement was not inten-
tional but rather a result of an incorrect reading of a judgment of the Court.
Similarly, in a subsequent ruling, the CJEU confirmed66 that, although national courts are 
not ‘immune’ from the state liability principle, damage caused to individuals by reason of an 
infringement of EU law, attributable to a national court adjudicating at last instance, could 
be incurred in exceptional cases where that court had manifestly infringed the applicable law. 
The emphasis on the ‘manifest’ nature of the EU law infringement is clearly a considerable 
limitation on the possibility of bringing a successful claim against the national judiciary. 
The adjective ‘manifest’ is of course resonant of the same expression used in the context of 
liability in damages of EU institutions. In this context— as discussed below— the Court set 
a very high bar requiring the applicant to show that the harmful act of the EU institution is 
so serious as to render the conduct of that institution ‘manifest and grave’ and bordering on 
the arbitrary.67
In the context of liability in damages for a failure by the national judiciary, the explanation 
of such a standard lies in two factors: first— in our view rather sensibly— in the acknowledg-
ment of the very nature of the difficult art of ‘adjudicating’ that is, the ‘interpretation of pro-
visions of law and the evaluation of facts and the evidence’,68 and secondly in the ‘political’ 
imperative for the CJEU not to compromise the delicate but vital dialogue with all judges 
across the Member States. It is clear that, faced with a virtual conflict of the duty/ right to refer 
and the possibility of liability in damages, the Court attempted to ‘minimise’ the harshness 
of damages actions. Some reassurances are also contained in a recent case where the Court 
clarified that the seriousness of a breach can thus never be based on whether action (to refer 
or not to refer) was taken on the basis of Article 267 TFEU, but only from the interpretation 
provided by the CJEU. The discretion of the national courts would be limited excessively ‘if 
the exercise of that discretion were a decisive factor in determining whether or not there had 
been an obvious infringement of EU law, in order to appraise, where appropriate, the liability 
of the Member State concerned for infringement of EU law’.69
(4)  The Third Condition: Causation
The third condition necessary to establish liability of a Member State in damages is— as in 
any domestic system of tort law— the existence of a causal link between the breach com-
mitted by the Member State and the damage suffered by the individuals. In tort law, the 
existence of such a causal link is usually determined by an evaluation of questions of fact and 
acquired evidence assessed in light of flexible general benchmarks such as the foreseeability 
of harm, its proximity, or even its proportionality. It is thus a criterion that naturally lends 
Court, after a long analysis of the directive and the freedom enjoyed by Member States concluded, nearly 
obiter in some circumstances, that it would have to be held that there was no sufficiently serious infringement 
before that date
66 Case C- 173/ 03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo [2006] ECR I- 5177, EU:C:2006:391.
67 Case 5/ 71 Aktien- Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council of the European Communities [1971] ECR 975, 
EU:C:1971:116.
68 Case C- 173/ 03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo (n 66) para 34.
69 Case C- 244/ 13 Ogieriakhi EU:C:2014:2068, para 54.
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itself to a ‘purely domestic’ determination and it is true that in most of the cases the CJEU 
simply defers its assessment to national courts, thereby implicitly accepting a certain degree 
of variation in the ‘day to day’ application of the state liability remedy. This is all true subject, 
however, to the general principle that all national laws, even those that are strictly procedural, 
need to be interpreted in accordance with EU law and in manner that safeguards the effective 
application of EU law.70
Thus, in some, very specific, contexts, the Court has felt it necessary to assess the existence 
of a causal link itself. For instance, in Rechberger, Geindl and Others v Austria71 the Court in 
dealing with the Austrian implementation of the Package Travel Directive72 held that, as the 
Directive had created a results- orientated obligation— that is to say compensation and repa-
triation ‘in the event of the travel organiser’s bankruptcy’73 excluding liability because of non- 
specific, exceptional and unforeseeable events would have rendered the EU right impossible 
to protect. In practice, what the Court did was to conflate causality and the first condition— 
the scope and determination of the EU right in question.
V. How Does an Action for Damages against the EU Work?
The right to recover damages from the EU is governed by Articles 268 and 340 TFEU, 
which, together, provide that an individual will be entitled to compensation in the event 
that an EU institution has caused loss in the performance of its duties, and that the CJEU 
will have exclusive competence with respect to such claims. Article 340(1) TFEU regulates 
the situation where an EU institution has entered into a formal contract with an individual 
and subsequently breached the terms of that contract. Article 340(2) TFEU, however, seeks 
to address the situation where an EU institution has caused loss through the exercise of its 
legislative, administrative or executive functions (so- called non- contractual liability). The fol-
lowing pages focus on non- contractual liability of the EU under Article 340(2) TFEU and 
deal with each of the elements for a claim for damages: admissibility; the substantive test for 
liability; causation; and compensation. As set out above, these elements are cumulative in 
nature. As such, failure to satisfy the requirements of any one of these criteria will result in the 
application being rejected without the Courts being required to examine the other criteria.74
Moreover, even before an applicant gets as far as the substantive criteria, there are numerous 
procedural hurdles that need to be overcome. Many of these hurdles— such as the need for 
70 In Case C- 94/ 10 Danfoss A/ S and Sauer- Danfoss ApS v Skatteministeriet [2011] ECR I- 9963, 
EU:C:2001:674, para 36, the Court held that the national legal system could not interpret the condition of a 
direct causal link in such a way as to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to obtain compensa-
tion for the damage suffered.
71 Case C- 140/ 97 Rechberger and Geindl v Austria (n 50).
72 Council Directive 90/ 314/ EEC (n 50).
73 Case C- 140/ 97 Rechberger and Geindl v Austria (n 50) para 74.
74 Case T- 121/ 08 PC- Ware Information Technologies v Commission EU:T:2010:183, paras 105– 106; Case 
T- 589/ 08 Evropaïki Dynamiki v Commission EU:T:2011:73, para 112; Case T- 514/ 09 bpost v Commission 
EU:T:2011:689, para 167; Case T- 587/ 10 Interspeed v Commission EU:T:2012:355, paras 38 and 56; Case T- 
114/ 11 Giordano v Commission EU:T:2012:585, paras 12– 13; Case T- 668/ 11 VIP Car Solutions v Parlement 
EU:T:2013:302, paras 34, 35, and 38; Case T- 415/ 10 Nexans France v Joint Undertaking Fusion for Energy 
EU:T:2013:141, paras 179– 180; Order of 17 July 2014 in Case C- 643/ 13 P Melkveebedrijf Overenk v 
Commission EU:C:2014:2118, para 25; Joined Cases T- 91/ 12 and T- 280/ 12 Flying Holding v Commission 
EU:T:2014:832, paras 115 and 118; Order of 13 January 2015 in Case T- 579/ 13 Istituto di vigilanza 
dell’urbe v Commission EU:T:2015:27, paras 75– 76; Joined Cases T- 539/ 12 and T- 150/ 13 Ziegler and Ziegler 
Relocation v Commission EU:T:2015:15, paras 59 and 60.
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the applicant to have standing; the need to respect the relevant limitation period; the need 
bring a claim against an entity subject to the relevant provision— are equivalent to those that 
need to be satisfied for other forms of action. Actions for damages against EU institutions, 
however, also entail a number of additional procedural elements that need to be satisfied if an 
applicant is to stand any chance of succeeding in its action.
The first of these requirements concerns the relationship between actions for damages and 
other forms of action. In particular, any ruling on the substantive merit of an action for 
damages will necessarily need to deal with the legality of the measure in question. This raises 
the question of whether the applicant should first be required to challenge the legality of the 
measure— for example by way of an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU— before 
being able to seek damages.
The second additional hurdle stems from the fact that Article 268 TFEU grants the CJEU 
exclusive competence to hear only actions based on acts of EU institutions. All other 
non- contractual damages claims fall within the jurisdiction of national courts.75 In many 
cases, there will be any number of different actors involved in adopting the measure that 
has allegedly caused the applicant harm. For example, directives need to be implemented 
by Member States. In such cases, which measure caused the harm— the directive or the 
implementing measure? The answer to this question determines which court will have jur-
isdiction (the EU Courts or the national courts) and, ultimately, the admissibility of the 
applicant’s claim.
A.  Procedural Rules Governing the Application of Article 340(2) TFEU
(1)  Classical Questions of Admissibility
Turning first to the classical questions of admissibility, any natural or legal person, who 
claims to have been injured by an act of the EU or one of its servants, has the possibility of 
bringing an action against the EU under Article 340(2) TFEU.76 In the case of legal persons, 
applicants must show that the damage affects their own assets, and that they are bringing 
their claim in their capacity as a legal person.77 While this criterion will not ordinarily pose 
any difficulty for private enterprises, associations or trade unions will only have standing to 
bring a claim on behalf of their members if the members have assigned their right to bring an 
action to the association seeking to bring the claim.78
Actions for damages may only be brought in respect of acts or omissions of the EU. If the 
EU is not the author of the act or conduct, there can be no liability on the part of the EU 
under Article 340(2) TFEU.79 It follows from this that a claim cannot be brought for damage 
75 Case 101/ 78 Granaria EU:C:1979:38 paras 14– 16; Joined Cases C- 67– 85/ 75 Dumortier Frères and 
Others v Commission EU:C:1976:42, para 7; Case C- 282/ 90 Vreugdenhil v Commission (Vreugdenhil II) 
EU:C:1992:124, para 12.
76 Case 118/ 83 CMC Cooperativa muratori e cementisti and Others v Commission EU:C:1985:308, para 
31. This applies, regardless of whether or not the applicant is a European citizen— see Case 119/ 77 Nippon 
Seiko v Council and Commission EU:C:1979:93; Case 239/ 82 Allied Corporation and Others v Commission 
EU:C:1984:68.
77 Case 114/ 83 Société d’Initiatives et de Coopération Agricole v Commission EU:C:1984:246, paras 3– 5; Case 
289/ 83 Groupement des Associations Agricoles pour l’Organisation de la Production et de la Commercialisation 
des Pommes de Terre et Légumes de la Région Malouine (GAARM) and Others v Commission EU:C:1984:398, 
paras 4– 5; Joined Cases T- 481/ 93 and T- 484/ 93 Vereniging van Exporteurs in Levende Varkens and Others v 
Commission (n 5) para 76.
78 Case 114/ 83 Société d’Initiatives et de Coopération Agricole v Commission (n 77) paras 3– 5 and 20– 22; 
Case 267/ 80 Birra Wührer SpA and Others v Council and Commission EU:C:1985:427.
79 Order in Case C- 520/ 12 P DES v Commission EU:C:2013:457 paras 35– 38; Order in Case T- 298/ 13 
Ledra Advertising v Commission EU:T:2014:986, paras 42– 47.
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caused arising out of an act of primary law, for example damage caused as a direct result of a 
Treaty amendment. Any Treaty, which seeks to amend the original EC Treaty is an act of the 
Member States and cannot be ascribed to the EU.80
With respect to the entities against which an action may be brought, in the strict sense, it 
is the EU that must be regarded as the defendant in actions brought under Article 340(2) 
TFEU and not the institutions, for they have no legal personality.81 The EU will then be 
represented by the institution or institutions against which the matter- giving rise to liability 
is alleged.82 The Court, however, has generally been prepared to accept both cases that bring 
an action against a specific institution, as well as claims brought against the EU as a whole, 
provided that it does not affect the rights of the defence.83
In respect of the institutions whose actions could cause the EU to be liable in damages, 
Article 340(2) TFEU encompasses measures adopted by the institutions listed in Article 13 
TEU,84 including the EU Courts themselves.85 Article 340(3) TFEU also provides that acts 
of the European Central Bank fall within the scope of Article 340(2) TFEU. The Court has 
also been prepared to hear cases brought against the European Investment Bank,86 and the 
European Ombudsman.87 The EU can only be liable for damage where the injury has been 
caused by an official act— that is, where the act was undertaken in the performance of the 
servant’s duties. Where this is not the case, then the servant will be personally liable before 
the national courts.88
With regard to the period within which a claim must be brought, Article 46 of the Statute 
of the Court of Justice provides that matters arising from non- contractual liability shall be 
barred after a period of five years from the occurrence of the event- giving rise to the damage. 
The time limit does not begin to run until the damage has materialized.89 Where the full 
extent of the damage does not materialize immediately, but develops over a period of time, 
the damages claim will continue to be admissible, but only in so far as the applicant seeks 
80 Case 169/ 73 Compagnie Continentale France v Council of the European Communities EU:C:1975:13, 
para 16; Joined Cases 31 and 35/ 86 Levantina Agricola Industrial SA (LAISA) and CPC España SA v Council 
of the European Communities EU:C:1988:211, paras 19– 22; Joined Cases 63– 69/ 72 Wilhelm Werhahn 
Hansamühle and Others v Council of the European Communities EU:C:1973:121, para 8; Case C- 353/ 88 
Briantex and Di Domenico v Commission EU:C:1989:415, para 7; Case T- 209/ 00 Lamberts v European 
Ombudsman EU:T:2002:94, para 48; Case T- 383/ 00 Beamglow v Parliament and Others EU:T:2005:453 para 
69; Order of 2 February 2015 in Case T- 577/ 14 Gascogne Sack Deutschland and Gascogne v European Union 
(n 29) paras 14– 20; Order of 6 January 2015, Case T- 479/ 14 Kendrion NV v European Union (n 29).
81 Case 302/ 87 European Parliament v Council EU:C:1988:461, para 9.
82 Joined Cases 63– 69/ 72 Wilhelm Werhahn Hansamühle and Others v Council of the European Communities 
(n 80); Case C- 353/ 88 Briantex and Di Domenico v Commission (n 80) para 7; Case T- 246/ 93 Bühring v 
Council and Commission EU:T:1998:21, para 26; Case T- 383/ 00 Beamglow v Parliament and Others (n 80)
para 68; Order of 6 September 2011 in Case T- 292/ 09 Mugraby v Council and Commission EU:T:2011:418, 
para 24.
83 Compare the claims brought in Case 106/ 81 Julius Kind KG v EEC EU:C:1982:291; and in Case 
T- 246/ 93 Günther Bühring v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities 
(n 82).
84 Despite previous case law to the contrary (see Case T- 346/ 03 Krikorian and Others v European 
Parliament and Others EU:T:2003:348, para17), following the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty and the aboli-
tion of the distinction between the European Communities and the European Union, acts of the European 
Council should now also be subject to TFEU art 340(2).
85 Case C- 40/ 12 P Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission (n 29) paras 80– 103; Case C- 58/ 12 P Groupe 
Gascogne v Commission (n 29) paras 72– 97; Case C- 50/ 12 P Kendrion v Commission (n 29) paras 38– 63.
86 Case C- 370/ 89 SGEEM and Etroy v EIB EU:C:1993:202, para 16.
87 Case T- 209/ 00 Lamberts v European Ombudsman (n 80).
88 Case 5/ 68 Claude Sayag and SA Zurich v Jean- Pierre Leduc and Others EU:C:1968:42.
89 Case 267/ 80 Birra Wührer and Others v Council and Commission (n 78).
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compensation for damage arising during a period not longer than five years from the time at 
which the action is brought.90
(2)  Procedural Rules: Independent Form of Action
Despite the inherent link between legality of the act in question and the applicant’s entitle-
ment to damages, actions brought under Article 340(2) TFEU constitute an independent 
form of action distinct from other forms of action before the EU Courts. This is because the 
purpose underlying actions brought under Article 340 TFEU is different to that, for exam-
ple, of actions for annulment brought under Article 263 TFEU or actions for failure to act 
under Article 265 TFEU. In contrast to these provisions, the primary purpose of Article 340 
TFEU is to establish a form of financial redress for individuals who have suffered loss as a 
result of the actions of the institutions, rather than to pronounce specifically on the validity 
of the measure in question.91 As such, as a general rule, it is not necessary to bring either an 
action for a failure to act or an action for annulment before being able to a claim for dam-
ages, or even have standing to bring such a claim, for such a prerequisite would be contrary 
to the independent nature of Article 340 TFEU.92 Consequently, a claim for damages will be 
admissible in cases where the injuries result from an act or a failure to act, which the individ-
ual either could not challenge or which was of a general character.93 However, the independ-
ence of actions under Article 340(2) TFEU is not absolute, and it cannot be used as a means 
to circumvent the (much) shorter limitation period applicable in respect of actions brought 
under Articles 263 or 265 TFEU. As such, where the individual is the direct addressee of the 
act, and, therefore, clearly has standing to bring an action for annulment— and failed to do 
so, such an action will be declared inadmissible, unless or until the applicant has brought an 
action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU.94 Similarly, if the EU Courts have already 
assessed the legality of a measure— either by way of a previous direct action or preliminary 
ruling— a subsequent action under Article 340(2) TFEU cannot call into question the EU 
Courts’ previous ruling.95
(3)  Procedural Rules: Which Court Has Jurisdiction?
As mentioned at the outset of this section, the Courts only have exclusive jurisdiction in 
respect of actions or damages based on acts of the relevant EU institutions. As such, an action 
for damages based directly on an act or omission of an institution will clearly fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Courts. In many situations, although an underlying act might originate 
from an EU institution, it is the authorities of Member States who implement those rules. 
For example, an EU measures requiring importers to obtain permits from national authori-
ties for the importation of goods into the EU is adopted by the EU, but it is implemented 
by the national authority, which decides whether to grant the licence.96 In such situations, 
in the event of illegality, which entity should be liable for damages— the EU institution that 
90 Case T- 174/ 00 Biret International SA v Council EU:T:2002:2.
91 Case 5/ 71 Aktien- Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council (n 67)  para 3; Case C- 131/ 03 P Reynolds 
Tobacco v Commission EU:C:2006:541, paras 82– 84; Case T- 135/ 09 Nexans France and Nexans v Commission 
EU:T:2012:596, para 133; Case T- 47/ 02 Danzer v Council EU:T:2006:167.
92 Case 5/ 71 Aktien- Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council(n 67); Case 4/ 69 Alfons Lütticke GmbH v 
Commission (n 4) para 6.
93 See eg Case 281/ 82 Société à responsabilité limitée Unifrex v Commission and Council EU:C:1984:165.
94 Case 4/ 67 Anne Muller (née Collignon) v Commission EU:C:1967:51.
95 Case T- 291/ 04 Enviro Tech Europe and Enviro Tech International v Commission EU:T:2011:760, 
para 138; Order of 13 December 1999 in Case T- 268/ 94 Tyco Toys and Others v Commission and Council 
EU:T:1999:316, para 24.
96 Judgment in Joined Cases 5, 7, and 13– 24/ 66 Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission EU:C:1967:31.
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adopted the act or the national entity that implemented it? The answer to this question will 
determine which court has jurisdiction. In making such a determination, the CJEU has 
distinguished between two different situations:  (i) those situations in which the national 
authorities incorrectly apply EU law; and (ii) those situations in which the national authori-
ties correctly apply EU law.
With respect to the first situation, the author of the wrongful act is clearly the national 
authority. As such any action for damages lies against the national authority before the 
national courts on the basis of the Francovich/ Brasserie du Pêcheur/ Factortame line of case law 
and no action can lie against the EU on the basis of Article 340 TFEU.97
Concerning the second situation, where it is the underlying EU law provision which is 
unlawful, the CJEU has ruled that a claim must be brought against the measure adopted 
by the national authorities before the national courts in these situations as well98— provided 
that the national courts have the power to afford the applicant effective judicial protection, 
including the award of compensation.99 If no such form of redress exists before the national 
court, this should render an action before the EU Courts under Article 340(2) TFEU admis-
sible.100 While the CJEU’s position in this respect may, on its face, appear counter- intuitive, 
the justification lies both in the scope of Article 268 TFEU and the test of causation: the act 
that caused the harm emanated from the national authority. It is, therefore, this act that was 
the cause of the harm— and such act falls outside of the scope of the Court’s competence as 
defined by Article 268 TFEU.
A third situation of ‘concurrent’ liability may also arise, whereby both the national authority 
and the EU institutions are responsible for the measure. Such a situation may arise, for exam-
ple, where an act of a national authority is not in conformity with EU law, but, nevertheless, 
has obtained approval from the Commission. The CJEU has held that in such situations of 
concurrent liability, an applicant seeking damages must, in general, first seek redress against 
national authorities before the national courts. It is only once this prerequisite has been com-
plied with that the applicant may then bring proceedings under Article 340(2) TFEU (the 
so- called ‘exhaustion rule’). In the event that an applicant fails to comply with the exhaustion 
rule, the EU Courts will declare an action under Article 340(2) TFEU inadmissible.101 If an 
applicant lodges two applications at the same time— one before the EU Courts against the 
EU institutions and one before the national courts against the national authorities— seeking 
compensation for the same injury— which could result in the applicant being either over 
compensated or under compensated, the EU Courts will wait until the national court has 
given judgment before ruling on the existence and the quantum of any damage payable by 
the EU institutions.102
97 Joined Cases 89 and 91/ 86 Etoile Commerciale and CNTA v Commission EU:C:1987:337 paras 16– 19; 
Case T- 261/ 94 Schulte v Council and Commission EU:T:2002:27 para 52; Case T- 571/ 93 Lefebvre v Commission 
EU:T:1995:163, para 66.
98 Case 281/ 82 Société à responsabilité limitée Unifrex v Commission and Council (n 93) paras 11– 12; Case 
T- 47/ 02 Danzer v Council (n 91) para 33.
99 Case 281/ 82 Société à responsabilité limitée Unifrex v Commission and Council (n 93) paras 11– 12.
100 Case 197/ 80 Ludwigshfener Walzmühle v Council and Commission EU:C:1981:311 para 9; Case 
T- 317/ 12 Holcim (Romania) v Commission EU:T:2014:782, paras 74– 75.
101 Case 96/ 71 R & V Haegeman v Commission EU:C:1972:88; Case 281/ 82 Société à responsabilité 
limitée Unifrex v Commission and Council (n 93).
102 Case 30/ 66 Becher v Commission EU:C:1967:33; and Case T- 138/ 03 É.R. and Others v Council and 
Commission EU:T:2006:390, para 42.
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B.  Substantive Rules under Article 340(2) TFEU
As set out in the first section of this chapter, following its ruling in Brasserie du Pêcheur and 
Factortame,103 the original distinction that the CJEU had drawn between legislative and admin-
istrative acts for the purposes of determining the relevant substantive test that needed to be 
satisfied in actions for damages against the EU became untenable. Consequently, in its ruling in 
Bergaderm,104 the CJEU chose, instead, to concentrate on the amount of discretion enjoyed by 
the EU institution. In doing so, the CJEU applied the conditions it had set down in Brasserie du 
Pêcheur and Factortame. In order to succeed in an action for damages against an EU institution, 
therefore, the applicant must show that: (i) the rule of law infringed conferred rights on individu-
als; (ii) the breach was sufficiently serious; and (ii) there is a direct causal link between the breach 
and the harm suffered.
(1)  Rules Conferring Rights on Individuals
Regardless of the seriousness of an EU institution’s potential breach, an applicant will only 
be entitled to recover damages where the rule in question is intended to confer rights on 
individuals. That condition is met if the rule in question, even if it (principally) concerns 
interests of a general nature, also protects the individual interests of the persons concerned,105 
regardless of the nature and scope of the act alleged to be unlawful, and, in particular, of the 
question whether the act affects a closed group or a limited number of persons.106 As such, 
breaches of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are capable of giving rise to actions for 
damages under Article 340(2) TFEU.107 To this end, the Courts have rejected claims in 
respect of provisions specifically intended to organize the division of powers between national 
authorities and the Commission,108 or which govern the EU’s relationship with the World 
Trade Organization.109
(2)  Sufficiently Serious Breach
The requirement of a sufficiently serious breach seeks, whatever the unlawful nature of the 
measure in question, to avoid a situation where the risk of having to bear the losses alleged 
by applicants hinders the ability of the EU institution to exercise fully its competences in the 
general interest, regardless of the general or individual nature of the measure,110 but without 
leaving third parties to bear the consequences of flagrant and inexcusable misconduct by the 
103 Joined Cases C- 46/ 93 and C- 48/ 93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame (n 11).
104 Case C- 352/ 98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission (n 15).
105 See, to that effect, Joined Cases 5, 7, and 13– 24/ 66 Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission (n 96); Case 
T- 209/ 00 Lamberts v European Ombudsman Lamberts v Ombudsman (n 80) para 87.
106 Case T- 341/ 07 Jose Maria Sison v Council EU:T:2011:687, paras 47 and 52.
107 Case C- 578/ 11 P Deltafina v Commission EU:C:2014:1742; Case C- 467/ 13 P ICF v Commission 
EU:C:2014:2274; Case C- 40/ 12 P Gascogne Sack Deutschland v Commission (n 29)  paras 80– 103; Case 
C- 58/ 12 P Groupe Gascogne v Commission (n 29) paras 72– 97; Case C- 50/ 12 P Kendrion v Commission (n 
29) paras 38– 63; Case C- 243/ 12 P FLS Plast v Commission EU:C:2014:2006.
108 Case T- 429/ 05 Artegodan v Commission EU:T:2010:60, paras 72– 75. Case C- 282/ 90 Vreugdenhil v 
Commission (Vreugdenhil II) (n 75) paras 20– 21. See also Case 106/ 81 Julius Kind v EEC (n 83), in which 
the Court held that insufficient reasoning— which normally is a ground for illegality— is not a breach of a 
superior rule for the protection of individuals, and is not therefore sufficient to ground a claim in damages 
under TFEU art 340(2).
109 See Case T- 18/ 99 Cordis Obst und Gemüse Großhandel v Commission EU:T:2001:95, paras 46 and 
51; Case T- 174/ 00 Biret International v Council (n 90) paras 60– 64; Case T- 69/ 00 FIAMM and FIAMM 
Technologies (n 34) paras 108– 15.
110 Case T- 429/ 05 Artegodan v Commission (n 108) para 54; Case C- 312/ 00 P Commission v Camar and 
Tico EU:C:2002:736, para 55; Case C- 472/ 00 P Commission v Fresh Marine EU:C:2003:399, para 27; Case 
T- 28/ 03 Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission EU:T:2005:139, para 48; and Case T- 155/ 99 Dieckmann & 
Hansen v Commission EU:T:2001:256, para 45.
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institution.111 In this respect, the CJEU, has defined ‘sufficiently serious’ as meaning a ‘mani-
fest and grave disregard by the institution for the limits of its discretion’.112 In determining 
whether an institution has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of its discretion, the 
EU Courts will essentially have regard to two principal elements: (i) whether the institution 
has behaved in a manner verging on the arbitrary; and (ii) whether the consequences of that 
behaviour exceeded the bounds of the economic risks inherent in the applicant carrying on 
business in the relevant sector.113
Where the relevant EU institution enjoys a broad margin of discretion, it can prove very 
difficult for an applicant to demonstrate that the institution has manifestly and gravely disre-
garded the limits of that discretion— even if the act itself has been annulled. This point was 
clearly demonstrated in a series of cases stemming from two regulations by which the EU 
attempted to regulate the over- production of milk in the EU. By a first regulation, the EU 
introduced a scheme under which dairy farmers were paid a premium for agreeing not to 
market milk for a period of five years. During the five- year period, new measures introduced 
a system of milk quotas, based on the previous year’s production levels, under which farmers 
were required to pay a special levy on milk produced over and above their quota. The first 
regulation did not make special provision for the farmers who had agreed not to market their 
milk. When the five- year period came to an end, the farmers were left in a position where 
they were no longer receiving a premium, and were unable to start marketing milk again 
because, based on the previous year’s production, their quota was set at zero. The first regula-
tion was annulled on the basis that it infringed the farmers’ legitimate expectations that they 
would be able to re- start their milk production activities after five years.114
As such, the EU introduced a second regulation setting the applicants’ quotas at 60 per cent 
of the milk they marketed in the year preceding that in which they stopped production. The 
CJEU also annulled the second regulation— also on the grounds that it infringed the farm-
ers’ legitimate expectations. In Mulder II, the applicants also brought an action for damages. 
The CJEU concluded that while the applicants were entitled to damages as a result of the 
first regulation, because the Council had failed to consider the applicants’ position at all, this 
was not the case with respect to the second regulation. In this case, the Council had taken 
the farmers’ positions into account in setting the quota and, even if the level of the quota 
breached the farmers’ legitimate expectations, the Council did not demonstrate a manifest 
disregard of its discretion that was sufficient to entitle the applicants to damages with respect 
to the second regulation.
In contrast to situations such as those described above, where the EU enjoys a broad margin 
of discretion, if the EU institution has only considerably reduced, or even no, discretion, 
111 Case T- 429/ 05 Artegodan v Commission (n 108) para 54; Case T- 351/ 03 Schneider Electric v Commission 
(Schneider II) EU:T:2007:212, para 125; and Case T- 212/ 03 MyTravel v Commission EU:T:2008:315, 
para 42.
112 See eg Joined Cases 83 and 94/ 76, 4, 15, and 40/ 77 HNL v Council and Commission EU:C:1978:113; 
Joined Cases 116 and 124/ 77 Amylum v Council and Commission EU:C:1979:273.
113 Joined Cases 116 and 124/ 77 Amylum v Council and Commission (n 114) paras 19– 21; Joined Cases 
C- 67– 85/ 75 Dumortier Frères and Others v Commission (n 75) paras 21– 22; Case 120/ 86 Mulder v Minister 
van Landbouw en Vissereij (Mulder I) EU:C:1988:213, para 24, and the Opinion of AG Van Gerven in Joined 
Cases C- 104/ 89 and C- 37/ 90 Mulder and Others v Council and Commission (Mulder II), EU:C:2000:38. For 
an extra- judicial commentary on the concept of a sufficiently serious breach, see also W Van Gerven, ‘Non- 
Contractual Liability of Member States, EU Institutions and Individuals for Breaches of EU Law with a view 
to a Common Law for Europe’ (n 18) 27– 28.
114 See Case 120/ 86 Mulder v Minister van Landbouw en Vissereij (Mulder I) (n 113); see also Joined Cases 
C- 104/ 89 and C- 37/ 90 Mulder and Others v Council and Commission (Mulder II) (n 113).
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the mere infringement of EU law may be sufficient to establish the existence of a sufficiently 
serious breach.115
While the degree of discretion enjoyed by the relevant institution will, in many cases, be 
determinative, it would be a mistake to think that the absence of discretion will automati-
cally result in the infringement being classified as a sufficiently serious breach of EU law such 
that an applicant will be entitled to recover compensation. While the extent of the discretion 
enjoyed by the institution concerned is of primary importance, its is not the only yardstick 
applied by the EU Courts. Rather, the complexity of the situation and the difficulties in 
the application or interpretation of the relevant legislation and whether the error made was 
intentional or inexcusable also needs to be taken into account,116 in conjunction with an 
assessment of the degree of discretion enjoyed by the relevant EU institution. As such, even 
if the institution in question does not enjoy any discretion in a given matter, only the finding 
that an irregularity would not have been committed in similar circumstances by an adminis-
trative authority exercising ordinary care and diligence will result in the EU being held liable 
in damages.117
(3)  Liability for Lawful Acts
Although a measure need not formally have been declared illegal under Article 263 TFEU 
for an applicant to be successful in damages, illegality is a pre- condition for being awarded 
compensation. Indeed, the CJEU has expressly held that, as EU law currently stands, the 
requirement that an act or omission constitute a breach of EU law in order for an applicant 
to be entitled to damages under Article 340(2) TFEU excludes the possibility of damages 
being awarded to compensate for loss suffered as a result of the effects of legal conduct by the 
institution.118 Two points are, however, worth noting in this respect.
First, in its ruling in FIAMM, the CJEU noted that where the measure in question, despite 
being lawful, constitutes a disproportionate and intolerable interference with rights guaran-
teed under EU law, an award of damages under Article 340(2) TFEU may be possible where 
the EU has failed to set up a regime to compensate individuals for such interference.119 It 
is clear, however, that damages awarded in such cases are not, strictly speaking, based on a 
lawful act. Rather, it is the institution’s unjustified failure to establish a compensation scheme 
which attracts liability.
Secondly, while an applicant may not, currently, be able to claim damages on the basis of a 
legal act, the Court has not ruled out the development of such a principle in the future.120 As 
such, in Dorsch Consult,121 despite leaving open whether, as a matter of principle, damages 
could be recovered for legal acts, the General Court (GC) nevertheless went on to set out the 
115 Case C- 352/ 98 P Bergaderm and Goupil v Commission (n 13) paras 42– 44; and T- 225/ 99 Comafrica 
and Dole Fresh Fruit Europe v Commission EU:T:2001:184, para 134.
116 Case C- 385/ 07 P Der Grüne Punkt— Duales System Deutschland v Commission EU:C:2009:456, paras 
181– 82; Case C- 578/ 11 P Deltafina v Commission (n 107); Case C- 467/ 13 P ICF v Commission (n 107); 
Case C- 58/ 12 P Groupe Gascogne v Commission (n 29); Case C- 50/ 12 P Kendrion v Commission (n 29); Case 
C- 243/ 12 P FLS Plast v Commission (n 110).
117 Case T- 333/ 10 ATC and Others v Commission EU:T:2014:842, para 63; Case T- 429/ 05 Artegodan v 
Commission (n 108) paras 59– 62; Case T- 341/ 07 Jose Maria Sison v Council (n 106) paras 33, 35– 37; Case 
T- 28/ 03 Holcim (Deutschland) v Commission (n 110) paras 114– 116.
118 Joined Cases C- 120 and 121/ 06 FIAMM and FIAMM Technologies v Council and Commission (n 34)
paras 164– 79.
119 Ibid paras 183– 84.
120 Ibid para 169.
121 Case T- 184/ 95 Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission EU:T:1998:74, para 80.
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conditions that would need to be satisfied for such a claim to succeed. The GC concluded 
that compensation would only be granted where the applicant satisfied three criteria:  the 
applicant must have suffered both (i) ‘special’ and (ii) ‘unusual’ damage, and (iii) the measure 
giving rise to the alleged damage was not justified by a general economic interest. Damage 
will be considered as ‘unusual’ if it exceeds the limits of the economic or technical risks inher-
ent in operating in the sector concerned and ‘special’ if it affects a particular class of economic 
operators in a disproportionate manner in comparison to other operators. On the facts of the 
case before it, the GC concluded that the applicant had suffered neither special nor unusual 
damage.122
(4)  Causation
The EU will only be liable to make good objectively foreseeable losses or injuries that have 
been directly caused by the EU.123 This requires the applicant to establish a sufficiently direct 
causal link between the alleged breach and the damage suffered.124 When assessing whether 
such a direct link exists, the EU Courts start from the premise that a comparison needs to 
be made between the situation brought about by the unlawful decision in question, and the 
situation that would have existed had the decision been adopted legally.125 In many cases, this 
will require the applicant to demonstrate that, had the breach not occurred, the content of 
the measure in question would have been different.126 For example, in Schneider Electric,127 
the applicant claimed damages following the annulment of a Commission decision prohibit-
ing a merger to which Schneider was a party. In order to succeed in its claim for damages, the 
GC held that Schneider needed to show that had the Commission not committed a breach 
it would have cleared the merger. The mere fact that the Commission’s decision had been 
annulled did not necessarily mean that it was the wrong decision. It could not be assumed 
that had the Commission not committed a breach it would have cleared the merger. It was 
up to the applicant to prove that this was the case.
Where the applicant fails to discharge this evidential burden the link between the breach 
and the loss will be judged too tenuous to be considered direct, and the applicant will not 
be able to recover. The likelihood of proving that a direct link exists between the measure 
in question and the damage will, therefore, be dependent upon the amount of discretion 
available to the institution. Where the institution has only limited discretion and a limited 
number of options in the way it comes to a decision it will be reasonably straightforward 
for the applicant to show what would have happened had the breach not occurred. Where 
122 For examples of situations when the EU Courts have assessed whether the alleged damage is special or 
unusual within the meaning of the Dorsch Consult test see Case T- 196/ 99 Area Cova v Council and Commission 
EU:T:2001:281; Case T-170/ 00 Förde- Reederei v Council and Commission EU:T:2002:34, para 56; Joined 
Cases C- 120 and 121/ 06 FIAMM (n 34)  Opinion of AG Maduro of 20 February 2008 EU:C:2008:98 
(for a comment on this case see A. Thies, Case note (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1145); Case 
T- 279/ 03 Galileo International Technology and Others v Commission EU:T:2006:121; Case T- 333/ 03 Masdar 
v Commission (n 34); Case T- 388/ 07 Comune di Napoli v Commission EU:T:2010:177, paras 184– 88; Order 
of 11 September 2013 in Case T- 540/ 11 Melkveebedrijf Overenk and Others v Commission EU:C:2014:2118, 
para 12; Case T- 317/ 12 Holcim (Romania) v Commission (n 103) paras 73– 75, 79– 80; Joined Cases C- 12 and 
13/ 13 P Buono and Others v Commission EU:C:2014:2284, paras 43, 46, and 64.
123 Case 5/ 71 Aktien- Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council (n 67); Case 4/ 69 Alfons Lütticke GmbH v 
Commission (n 4) para 10; Case T- 184/ 95 Dorsch Consult v Council and Commission (n 121).
124 Case T- 149/ 96 Confederazione Nazionale Coltivatori Diretti (Coldiretti) and 110 farmers v Council 
and Commission EU:T:1998:228, para 101; Case T- 178/ 98 Fresh Marine v Commission, EU:T:2000:240, 
para 118.
125 Case T- 351/ 03 Schneider Electric v Commission (Schneider II) (n 111) paras 264– 65.
126 Case T- 252/ 07 Sungro and Others v Council and Commission EU:T:2010:17, paras 60– 63.
127 Case T- 351/ 03 Schneider Electric v Commission (Schneider II) (n 111) paras 264– 65.
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the institution enjoys a greater level of discretion, however, and can implement a meas-
ure in different ways, taking into consideration different factors, it will be difficult for the 
applicant to satisfy the causation requirements. In addition, the EU Courts assume that the 
prudent person will mitigate the loss suffered. Where the applicant has failed to do this, 
the EU Court will hold that his acts have contributed to the loss suffered, and reduce the 
amount of compensation accordingly.128 Furthermore, possible negligence on the part of the 
applicant may even break the chain of causation altogether, leaving the applicant without 
any compensation.129
(5)  Damages
Once an applicant has satisfied the Court that all of the conditions for liability exist, it is up 
to the Court to assess whether damages should be awarded and, if so, how much the appli-
cant should receive. Although in the vast majority of cases the applicant in a case brought 
pursuant to Article 340(2) TFEU will be seeking financial compensation, the EU Courts are 
not limited to granting only financial compensation. Rather, the EU Courts have the power 
to impose compensation in kind, such as, for example, the granting of an injunction to do 
or not to do something, if this accords with the general principles of non- contractual liability 
common to the laws of the Member States.130
The underlying principle when awarding compensation is to put the applicant in, or as 
close as possible to, the position that it would have been in, had the unlawful act not been 
adopted.131 However, even if an applicant has convinced the Court that it is entitled to 
receive damages, this does not mean that it will be able to recover compensation for the 
entirety of its potential loss. Applicants are only entitled to be compensated for losses that 
are actual and certain and it is up to the applicant in each case to demonstrate the existence 
of such loss.132 As such, the applicant must put forward evidence of the damage claimed; the 
nature and the, at least approximate, extent of that damage.133 A general claim for unspecified 
damages will not, under normal circumstances, be sufficiently concrete for an application to 
be valid and the claim is therefore liable to be dismissed.134 Similarly, a claim for an amount 
of damages without any indication of the calculation leading to that amount will also usu-
ally be dismissed as insufficiently substantiated.135 Furthermore, where an applicant has, or 
could reasonably have been expected to have, ‘passed- on’ any losses suffered— for example, 
128 See, to that effect, Joined Cases C- 46/ 93 and C- 48/ 93 Brasserie du Pêcheur and Factortame (n 11) 
paras 82– 85.
129 Case T- 572/ 93 Odrigitria v Council and Commission EU:T:1995:131.
130 Case T- 279/ 03 Galileo International Technology and Others v Commission (n 122) para 63; Case T- 88/ 
09 Idromacchine and Others v Commission EU:T:2011:641, para 81.
131 Case C- 238/ 78 Ireks- Arkady v Council and Commission EU:C:1979:203.
132 Case C- 611/ 12 P Giordano v Commission EU:C:2014:2282, para 36; Case C- 243/ 05 Agraz v 
Commission EU:C:2006:708, para 27; C- 51/ 81 De Franceschi v Council and Commission EU:C:1982:20, para 
9; Case 267/ 80 Birra Wührer SpA and Others v Council and Commission (n 78) para 9; and Case C- 362/ 95 P 
Blackspur DIY and Others v Council and Commission EU:C:1997:401, para 31.
133 Case T- 64/ 89 Automec Srl v Commission EU:T:1990:42, para 73; Case T- 149/ 96 Confederazione 
Nazionale Coltivatori Diretti (Coldiretti) v Council and Commission (n 123). See also Joined Cases 29, 31, 
36, 39– 47, 50, and 51/ 63 SA des Laminoirs, Hauts Fourneaux, Forges, Fonderies et Usines de la Providence 
and Others v High Authority EU:C:1966:29, where the ECJ held that an ‘exact assessment’ of the damage 
sustained is needed, but an approximate determination based on sufficiently reliable facts, preferably collected 
by an expert, will suffice if it is not possible to make an exact assessment. See also Case 90/ 78 Granaria BV v 
Council and Commission [1979] ECR 1081, paras 5 and 6.
134 Case 5/ 71 Aktien- Zuckerfabrik Schöppenstedt v Council (n 67)  984; Case T- 149/ 96 Confederazione 
Nazionale Coltivatori Diretti (Coldiretti) and 110 farmers v Council and Commission (n 124) para 173.
135 Case C- 401/ 96 P Somaco v Commission EU:C:1998:208, para 73.
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by increasing prices to customers to offset an illegally levied charge— the applicant will not 
be entitled to an award of damages.136
With respect to the types of damages that can be recovered, the EU Courts have previously 
recognized a number of different heads of damages. These include damages in the form of lost 
profits, losses of future earnings, and non- material damage.
In respect of lost profits, the EU Courts are only willing to allow applicants to recover such 
damages to the extent that the applicant can show that it was legitimately entitled to make 
the profit and was only prevented from doing so by an unlawful act of the EU.137 Regarding 
future losses, such harm can be compensated provided that the damage— even if it cannot 
be precisely quantified138— is foreseeable with sufficient certainty. The Court will not allow a 
claim for future damages, however, where the damage ‘appears to be possible’ or ‘might ensue 
in the future’. Such a claim will be too doubtful and insufficiently precise.139
The Court has also been willing to award compensation for non- material losses. In Algera, 
the Court awarded Miss Algera, an EU employee whose appointment had been wrongfully 
withdrawn, US$100 in respect of the upheaval and discomfort that the EU action had caused 
her.140 The Court has also been willing to accept a claim in damages as a result of damage 
caused to the applicant’s reputation,141 damage caused by a five- year delay in handling a 
request for recognition of a professional illness,142 and erroneous exclusion from an internal 
competition.143 In many cases, however, the Court has simply ruled that the annulment of 
the contested decision sufficiently repaired any injury to the applicant and, therefore, did not 
grant damages.144
VI. Conclusions
Damages actions under EU law are a rather strange creature shaped by multiple influences 
and, as with any procedure, the devil is in the detail. It must also be admitted that despite 
the formal equality between actions against Member States and actions against the EU, 
and their common substantive bases following Bergaderm, there are still many differences 
between the two. Furthermore, the success of an action for damages should ultimately be 
measured in terms of monetary success. There are unfortunately still too few statistics on 
the outcome of actions before national and EU courts with detailed figures and reliable 
data to be able to perform such an analysis. However, regardless of the different opinions 
and the many shortcomings, we would humbly suggest that even if it is widely accepted 
that damages might not always be the most effective form of redressing the effects of 
136 Case C- 238/ 78 Ireks- Arkady v Council and Commission (n 131) para 14; see further C. Rudden and 
W. Bishop, ‘Gritz and Quellmehl: Pass It On’ (1981) 6 European Law Review 243.
137 Joined Cases 5, 7, and 13– 24/ 66 Kampffmeyer and Others v Commission (n 96).
138 Ibid paras 6– 8.
139 Case 147/ 83 Münchener Import- Weinkellerei Herold Binderer GmbH v Commission EU:C:1985:26, 
paras 19– 20.
140 Joined Cases 7/ 56, 3– 7/ 57 Dineke Algera and Others v Common Assembly EU:C:1957:7. See also Case 
25/ 60 De Bruyn v Common Assembly EU:C:1962:6.
141 Case T- 231/ 97 New Europe Consulting and Brown v Commission EU:T:1999:146.
142 Case T- 165/ 89 Plug v Commission EU:T:1992:27.
143 Case T- 84/ 91 Meskens v Parliament EU:T:1992:103.
144 See Joined Cases 59 and 129/ 80 Turner v Commission EU:C:1981:170, paras 73– 74; Case T- 100/ 98R 
Goldstein v Commission EU:T:1998:252, para 22.
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tortious actions or of providing full satisfaction to the individuals affected, the right to 
compensation is a basic principle of not only all the European legal systems but of our 
civilization as well— and the ability to bring an action for damages has a rightful place in 
the EU system of judicial protection. In this regard, if read in its entirety, the corpus iuris 
precept, usually identified as one of the first codifications of a damages action, is ‘honeste 
vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere’.145 That is, in modern English: you should 
not only refrain from injuring one another but also live honestly, and to give to each one 
that which belongs to him or her.
145 Justinian’s Institutiones 1,1,3– 4.
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